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It may be the last supposition explains why this particular error
became a cause for reversal. For it has been held that if the judge
states the law incorrectly in his instructions, he may later recall the
jury and correct the mistake; or, that if the judge fails to make this
correction, a proper verdict will cure the error.' 3
EDWIN E. BUTLER.
Suretyship-Liability on Bond in Excess of
Statutory Penalty.
The defendant surety company executed an official bond with a
penalty of $25,000. The statute requiring such bond specified an
amount "not more than $15,000.' In a summary proceeding pro-
vided by statute for cases of default on official bonds, 2 held, that since
the surety acted voluntarily and accepted premiums on the larger
amount, it is estopped to deny the validity of the bond, and recovery
may be had for the full amount.3
When a statutory bond supersedes the statute in the amount of its
penalty, three possibilities arise: the bond may be (1) void, (2) valid
up to the statutory amount, (3) valid to the full amount of its
penalty.
Where the excessive penalty is extorted colore officii, or is not
given voluntarily, bonds have been held completely void.4 But where
the larger penalty is voluntarily assumed, the general rule is that the
bond is good to the full extent of the penalty if not prohibited by
""We believe the district attorney's law good, but even if it were bad,
verdicts are not set aside because the district attorney has argued bad law to
the jury." State v. Wren, 121 La. 55, 46 So. 99 (1908).
Also, Roundtree v. Britt, 94 N. C. 104 (1886) ; Glenn v. Charlotte & S. C.
R. R. Co., 63 N. C. 510 (1868); Vincent v. Corbin, 85 N. C. 108 (1881);
McINTosH op. cit. mspra note 7 at 673.
' N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §927.
'N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §356.
'State v. Gant, 201 N. C. 211, 159 S. E. 427 (1931) (official bond of clerk
of superior court).
' Bail bonds have been held void where the sheriff required a larger penalty
than the court directed: Barringer v. State, 27 Tex. 553 (1864) ; Neblett v.
State, 6 Tex. App. 316 (1879) ; Roberts v. State, 34 Kan. 151, 8 Pac. 246, 6 Am.
Crim. Rep. 61 (1885) ; Waugh v. People, 17 Ill. 561 (1856). Appeal bonds have
been held void where the court exacted a larger penalty than the statute re-
quired: Commonwealth v. Wistar, 142 Pa. 373, 21 Atl. 872 (1891) ; Newcombe
v. Worster, 7 Allen 198 (Mass. 1863) ; An official bond was declared void where
an excess penalty was extorted colore offlcii by superior officers: United States
v. Humason, 6 Sawy. 199, Fed. Cas. 15421 (1879). Embargo bonds have been
held void for the same reason: United States v. Morgan, 3 Wash. C. C. 10, Fed.
Cas. 15809 (1811); United States v. Gordon, I Brock. 190, Fed. Cas. 15232
(1811), writ of error dismissed in 7 Cranch (U. S.) 287, 3 L. ed. 347 (1813).
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statute. 5 However, there are a few cases which hold that recovery
cannot be had for a greater amount than the statute provides.6
Closely analogous to the present situation is that in which the bond
supersedes the statute by requiring certain conditions for which the
statute does not provide. The general rule is that if the added or
extra-statutory conditions are separable from those required by the
statute, they will be rejected as mere surplusage, 7 since the bond is
measured by the statute.8 This rule has been applied to practically
every type of bond,9 even where the extra-statutory conditions are
Henderson v. Matlock, 9 N. C. 366 (1822) (official bond of sheriff) ; State
Bank v. Twitty, 9 N. C. 5 (1822) (official bond of sheriff); Governor v.
Witherspoon, 10 N. C. 42 (1824) (official bond of sheriff) ; Parks v. Allen, 2
Head. 523 (Tenn. 1859) (bond of the contestants of a will) ; The Stevens v.
Treasurers, 2 M'Cord. L. 107 (S. C. 1822) (official bond of a sheriff) ; State v.
Taylor, 10 S. D. 185, 72 N. W. 408, 66 Am. St. Rep. 709 (1897) (official bond
of a treasurer) ; Matthews v. Lee, 25 Miss. 417 (1853) (tax collector's bond) ;
In re Read, 34 Ark. 239 (1879) (official bond of a county treasurer) ; Bur-
roughs v. Lowder, 8 Mass. 373 (1812) (bond on a debt) ; Johnson v. Gwathney.
2 Bibb 186, 4 Am. Dec. 694 (Ky. 1810) (official bond of a sheriff); Speake v.
United States, 9 Cranch 28, 3 L. ed. 645 (1815) (embargo bond).
'Graham v. State, 66 Ind. 386 (1879) (official bond of a county auditor);
M'Caraher v. Commonwealth, 5 W. & S. 21, 39 Am. Dec. 106 (Pa. 1842)
(official bond of a recorder of deeds) ; State v. Rhoades, 6 Nev. 352 (1870)
(official bond of a state treasurer) ; Meador et at. v. Adams, 33 Tex. Civ. App.
167, 76 S. W. 238 (1903) (bond for the sale of malt liquors) ; The Treasurers
v. Bates, 2 Bail L. 362 (S. C. 1831) (official bond of a sheriff).
'United States Fidelity Co. v. Iowa Telephone Co., 174 Iowa 476, 156 N. W.
727 (1916) (bond in compliance with a municipal ordinance to insure restoration
of excavated streets).
'Globe Indemnity Co. v. Barnes, 288 S. W. 121 (Tex. Com. App., 1926)
(bond for the sale of school books to the state) ; Joint Board of Supervisors v.
Title Guaranty and Surety Co., 198 Iowa 1382, 201 N. W. 88 (1924) (drainage
contractor's bond); Tug River Lumber Co. v. Smithey, 107 W. Va. 482, 148
S. E. 850 (1929) (building contractor's bond) ; Hicks v. Randich, 106 W. Va.
109, 144 S. E. 887 (1928) (public contractor's bond).
'This rule has been most commonly applied in the case of a contractor's
bond: Wholesale Grocer Co. v. Prutsman, 1 La. App. 731 (1926); John H.
Murphy Iron Works v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 169 La. 163,
124 So. 768 (1930) ; State v. Jackson and Co., 137 La. 945, 69 So. 751 (1915) ;
Miller v. Bonner, 163 La. 332, 111 So. 776 (1927) ; Philip Carey Lumber Co. v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 201 Iowa 1063, 206 N. W. 808, 47 A. L. R. 495 (1926) ;
Nebraska Culvert and Manufacturing Co. v. Freeman, 197 Iowa 720, 198 N. W.
7 (1924) ; Charles City v. Rasmussen, 232 N. W. 137, 72 A. L. R. 638 (1930) ;
Monona County v. O'Connor, 205 Iowa 1119, 215 N. W. 803 (1927); American
Surety Co. v. School District, 117 Neb. 6, 219 N. W. 583 (1928). Other kinds
of bonds where the rule has been applied are: Dallas County v. Perry National
Bank, 205 Iowa 672, 216 N. W. 119 (1927) (depository bond) ; Lee v. Waring,
3 Desauss Eq. 57 (S. C. 1809) (official bond of a state treasurer); United
States v. Howell, 14 Wash. C. C. 620, Fed. Cas. 15405 (1826) (official bond) ;
Skellinger v. Yendes, 12 Wend. 306 (N. Y. 1834) (official bond of a constable) ;
Zapf v. Ridenhour, 198 Iowa 1006, 200 N. W. 618 (1924) (broker's bond) ;
Curtis v. Michaelson, 206 Iowa 111, 219 N. W. 49 (1928) (liability insurance
bond); Pratt v. Wright, 54 Va. 175, 67 Am. Dec. 767 (1856) (guardian's
bond); Branch v. Richmond Cold Storage Co., 146 Va. 680, 132 S. E. 848
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voluntarily assumed.' 0 If the excess conditions be extorted colore
officii, the bond will be declared absolutely void by some courts."
Contra to the general rule, however, there are cases which hold
that where the extra-statutory conditions are voluntarily assumed 12
for a sufficient consideration,' 3 the bond will be enforced to the full
extent as a valid common law obligation or voluntary bond,14 pro-
vided it is not repugnant to any statute or contrary to public policy.' 5
A few courts hold that after deriving the benefits secured by the bond
the surety will be estopped to deny its validity.16
In following the weight of authority in regard to excess penalties
the instant case lays down a rule that is both reasonable and just, since
(1926) (suspending bond); State v. Read, 164 La. 315, 113 So. 860 (1927)
(peace bond) ; Yost v. Ramey, 103 Va. 117, 48 S. E. 862 (1904) (executor's
bond) ; Sheppard i. Collins, 12 Iowa 570 (1861) (attachment bond) ; State v.
Castleberry, 23 Ala. 85 (1853) (bastardy bond) ; Probate Court v. Adams, 27
R. I. 97, 60 Ati. 769, 8 ANN. CAs. 1028 (1905) (executor's bond) ; Lowe v.
Guthrie, 4 Okla. 287, 44 Pac. 198 (1896) (official bond of a city clerk) ; See
Ainsworthy v. Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. 277, 14 Pac. 590, 591 (1882) (bail
bond); State of Ohio v. Findlay, 10 Ohio 51, 54 (1840) (official bond of a
county treasurer); Sochet v. Sochet, 70 Colo. 23, 196 Pac. 192, 193 (1921)
(he exeat bond); Sauer v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 192 Ky. 758, 234 S. W.
434, 436 (1921) (policeman's bond).
" Long Bell Lumber Co. v. South Dakota Car. Construction Co., 133 So. 438
(La. 1931) (contractor's bond); Schisel v. Marvill et al., 198 Iowa 725, 197
N. W. 662 (1924) (contractor's bond).
"United States v. Tingey, 5 Pet. (U. S.) 115, 8 L. ed. 66 (1831) (purser's
bond); District of Columbia v. Waggman, 4 Mackey 328 (D. C. 1886) (real
estate agent's bond) ; See State ex rel Griffith v. Purcell, 31 W. Va. 44, 5 S. E.
301, 314 (1888) (injunction bond).
"Slutter v. Kirkendall, 100 Pa. St. Rep. 307 (1882) (attachment bond);
Franklin Bank v. Cooper, 36 Me. 179 (1853) (official bond of cashier covering
past receipts as well as future property) ; United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Co. v. Rainey, 120 Tenn. 357, 113 S. W. 397 (1908) (official bond); Manitowoc
Co. v. Truman, 91 Wis. 14, 64 N. W. 307 (1895) (depository bond); Fitzgerald
v. Neal et al., 113 Ore. 103, 231 Pac. 645 (1924) (public contractor's bond);
Ring v. Gibbs, 26 Wend. 502 (N. Y. 1841) (bond to release a ship) ; State ex
rel Griffith v. Purcell, upra note 11.
Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Rainey, supra note 12; Manitowoc Co. v.
Truman, supra note 12.
" Coons v. People, 76 Ill. 383 (1875) (official bond of a county collector);
Chadwick v. United States, 3 Fed. 750 (C. C. D. Mass. 1880) (collector's
bond) ; Taylor v. Fleckenstein, 30 Fed. 99 (C. C. D. Ore. 1887) (bail bond) ;
cases cited, supra note 12. It is interesting to note that Virginia applies this
rule only to a contractor's bond: Aetna Casualty Co. v. Earle-Lansdell Co., 142
Va. 435, 129 S. E. 263 (1925).
Taylor v. Fleckenstein, supra note 14; City of Philadelphia v. Shallcross,
14 Phila. 135 (Pa. 1880) (official bond of a tax receiver); Manitowoc Co. v.
Truman, supra note 12; Coons v. People, upra note 14; Duke v. National
Surety Co., 130 Wash. 276, 227 Pac. 2 (1924), judgment affirmed on rehearing,
131 Wash. 700, 230 Pac. 102 (1924) (bank's bond).
" Coons v. People, supra note 14; United States v. Hodson, 10 Wall. (U. S.)
395, 19 L. ed. 937 (1870) (bond of licensed distiller).
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the surety in executing an official bond is presumed to know the terms
of the statute under which he executed the bond.'
7
In certain respects the case is unusual; it is a strong holding in
that the statute specifically provided that the bond be "not more than
$15,000"; and it was decided on the basis of estoppel, which basis
might be seriously questioned since it is difficult to see wherein the
surety was estopped as to the state.
It is of especial interest to note that the case involved a summary
proceeding under the statute. The summary remedy has been de-
clared constitutional in North Carolina,' 8 but its use has been denied
where the penalty superseded the statute19 as in the present case, the
reason assigned by the court being that since the bond was not in
conformity with the statute, it was not a statutory bond to which the
summary remedy would apply. As there is-no essential difference
between the then existent statute on summary remedy20 and the one
now in force, the present case is apparently a direct reversal of the
previous holding.
FRANK P. SPRUILL, JR.
Taxation-Discriminatory License Classifications--Limitations
of Equal Protection and Commerce Clauses.
The 1931 General Assembly of North Carolina imposed a license
tax of $50 per truck upon persons, firms or corporations who sell
fresh fish, fruits or vegetables and who do not maintain a permanent
place of business in the State, but exempted persons, firms or cor-
' See Fogarty v. Davis, 305 Mo. 288, 264 S. W. 879; 880 (1929) (school con-
tractor's bond) ; Crawford v. Ozark Insurance Co., 97 Ark. 549, 134 S. W. 951,
952 (1911) (statutory bond) ; 9 C. J. 34, §56.
"Anonymous Case, 2 N. C. 29 (1794) (judgment against receivers of public
monies); Oats v. Darden, 5 N. C. 500 (1810) (summary remedy against a
sheriff); Broughton v. Haywood, 61 N. C. 380 (1867) (summary proceeding
against sureties for Clerk and Master in Equity).
" State Bank v. Twitty; Henderson v. Matlock; Governor v. Witherspoon,
all s=pra note 5.
'Acts of North Carolina Assembly of 1795, c. VIII, §5: "And be it further
enacted that when any constable or constables in any county within this state
shall or may have received any money in virtue of his office or appointment as
constable, and shall fail to pay the same to the person or persons entitled to
receive it, that then and in that case it shall and may be lawful upon motion
made in the court of the county in which said constable resides for said court
to give judgment against said constable or constables and his or their securities
for all sum or sums of money so received and collected, together with costs,
and to award execution thereon in the same manner as other executions issuing
from said court, provided, such constable has ten days previous notice of such
motion...."
